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NOTES
HistoricalBackground
ADVERSE POSSESSION IN INDIANA. - Probably one of the most important means by which one may obtain an original title to real estate
is Adverse Possession. Of course, the obvious question now arises;
what is adverse possession? Consequently, it may be well, first, to
delve into some of the more prominent authorities that one may better
understand the courts' interpretation of the concepts of adverse possession. One of the leading Indiana cases 1 seems to set forth that,
in substance, adverse possession is the open, notorious, hostile, continuous, exclusive possession of property for the statutory period in
defiance to all other claimants of the property. Another authority 2
states adverse possession to be, "The actual, open, and notorious possession and enjoyment of real property, or of any estate lying in grant,
1 Philbin v. Carr, 75 Ind. App. 560, 129 N. E. 19 (1920); Craven v. Craven,
181 Ind. 553, 103 N. E. 333 (1913).
2 BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY.
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continued for a certain length of time, held adversely and in denial and
opposition to the title of another claimant, or under circumstances
which indicate an assertion of color of right or title on the part of the
person maintaining it, as against another person who is out of possession." Now, that one has an understanding of the legal definition
of adverse possession, let us go a step further and trace the evolution
of the concept of adverse possession.
Like many of the other laws embodied in American jurisprudence,
the statutes which allow adverse possession in the United States found
their way to this country from our English neighbors. As.early as 1275,
there. was an enactment of a statute in England which dealt with the
problems involved in adverse possession. 3 However, it was not until
1623, that England passed the statute which stands as the corner stone
4
upon which has been built American statutes of adverse possession.
3 Sta. 3 Edw. I c. 39 (1275).
4 Stat. 21 Jac. I, c. 16, 1, 2 (1625).
"L For quieting of men's estates, and avoiding of suits, be it enacted by the
King's most excellent majesty, the lands spiritual and temporal, and commons, in
this present Parliament assembled, and formedon in reverter, at any time hereafter
to be sued or brought, of or for any manors, lands, tenements, or hereditaments,
whereunto any person or persons now hath or have any title, or cause to have or
pursue any such writ, shall be sued and taken within twenty years next after the
end of this present session of Parliament; and after the said twenty years expired,
no such person or persons, or any of their heirs, shall have or maintain any such
writ, of or for any of the said manors, lands, tenements or hereditaments; (2) and
that all writs of formedon in descender, formedon in remainder, and formedon in
reverter, of any manors, lands, tenements, or other hereditaments whatsoever, at
any time hereafter to be used or brought by occasion or means of any title or
cause hereafter happening, shall be sued and taken within twenty years next after
the title and cause of action first descended or fallen, and at no time after the said
twenty years; (3) and that no person or persons that now hath any right or title
of entry into any manors, lands, tenements or hereditaments now held from him
or them, shall thereinto enter, but within twenty years next after the end of this
present session of Parliament, or within twenty years next after any other title
of entry accrued; (4) and that no person or persons shall at any time hereafter
make any entry into any lands, tenements or hereditaments, but within twenty
years next after his or their right.or title which shall hereafter first descend or
accrue to the same; and in default thereof, such persons so not entering, and
their heirs, shall be utterly excluded and disabled from such entry after to be
made; any former law or Statute to the contrary notwithstanding.
"II. Provided nevertheless, That if any person or persons, that is or shall be
entitled to such writ or writs, or that hath or shall have such right or title of
entry, be or shall be atthe time of the said right or title first descended, accrued,
come or fallen, within the age of one and twenty years, femme covert, non compos
mentis, imprisoned or beyond the seas, that then such person or persons, and his or
their heir and heirs shall or may, nothwithstanding the said twenty years be expired, bring his action, or make his entry as he might have done before this Act.
(2) so as such person and persons, or his or their heir and heirs, shall within ten
years next after his and -their full age, discoveture, coming of sound mind, enlargement out of prison, or coming into this realm, or death, take benefit of and
sue forth the same, and at no time after the said ten years."
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Thus, from the English law, the basic principles of adverse possession found their way into- this country. However, the right to gain an
original title to land by open, notorious, hostile, continuous, exclusive
possession is not a common law right, but rather this right is completely statutory and as such, the requirements for adverse possession
depend solely upon the state statutes. Thus, the problem as to whether
or not one is entitled to gain an original title to land by adverse possession is essentially a problem of statutory construction. The present
article purports to discuss this problem of statutory construction in regard to the Indiana statutes.
Reason for Adverse Possession
Having traced the historical trend of adverse possession, there is another question which looms before one; namely, what is the reason for
having the right of adverse possession? To answer this question adequately, one must again go to the authorities. One of the leading exponents on the subject of real property analyzes his reason for the
statutes creating the right of adverse possession when he says, "The
desirability of fixing, by law, a definite period within which claims to
land must be asserted has been generally recognized, among the practical considerations in favor of such a policy being the prevention of
the making of illegal claims after the evidence necessary to defeat
them has been lost, and the interest which the community as a whole
has in the security of title. The moral justification of the policy lies
in the consideration that one who has reason to know that land belonging to him is in the possession of another, and neglects, for a considerable period of time, to assert his right thereto, may properly be penalized by his preclusion from thereafter asserting such right. It is apparently, by reason of the demerit of the true owner rather than any
supposed merit in the person who has acquired wrongful possession
of the land, that this possession if continued for the statutory period
operates, to debar the former owner of all right to recover the land." 5
However, the State of Indiana, through the medium of the court,
has taken somewhat of a different view. In a leading Indiana case the
court says, "The intention is not to punish one who neglects to assert
his title, but to protect those who maintain the possession of the land
for the time specified by the statute under claim of right or color of
title." i
Another Indiana case i states, "Thus, while the statute is barring
the right of recovery on the part of the true owner, it is ripening the
title in the holder."
5

TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3rd Edition, § 1134, Theory of Legislation.

6 Craven v. Craven, supra.
7 Jasperson v. Scharnikow, 150 Fed. 571, 80 C. C. A. 373, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1178 (1907).
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From these authorities it might be possible to deduce that in reality
the reason for allowing adverse possession is two-fold, to penalize the
legal title holder for his laches, and to reward the adverse possessor
for his occupancy. This concept is based on the theory that land should
be used and a premium is given to the one who keeps the land occupied
and used. Thus, by allowing one to gain title to land by adverse possession, the party who does not till the soil or pay attention to the activities upon his land is punished for this non-interest or laches, and
the party who claims such land, lives on it and improves it, is rewarded
for his interest thereon by giving him title to the land at the end of
the statut6ry period. Also, as a practical matter, the law needs adverse
possession as a post upon which to hang mistakes in recording, defects
in title, etc.
So, briefly, it may be said that the right of adverse possession developed as a matter of public policy, that long limb of justice on which
needed legal principles are hung where no other branch of the law is
available.
Status of Adverse Possessionin Indiana
Indiana, like the other states of the union, early saw a need for a
statutory enactment which would require one who owned property and
sought recovery of possession of said property to bring an action for
recovery of possession of said property within some specified time. So,
in the statute passed by the Indiana Legislature one. may find the following under Limitation of Actions, "The following actions shall be
commenced within the periods herein prescribed after the cause of action has accrued, and not thereafter:...
Six: ... and for the recovery of the possession of real estate, within

twenty years." 8 This statute has been in force for many years and it
is the statute used by adverse claimants as a defense in suits of ejectment. So, in Indiana, the requirements for adverse possession were simply that the adverse party hold the property as his own against the
world in an -open, notorious, hostile, exclusive and continuous manner
for the statutory period of twenty years.9
Then came the year 1927. This particular year may not have affected the world in general, but in Indiana in regard to adverse possession the "lid was blown off the kettle" by the passage of Chapter
42, Acts 1927 Indiana Legislature.
In 1927, in the State of Indiana, there was great agitation in the
northern part of the state caused principally by "squatters" who were
obtaining original titles to lands by adverse possession. The principal
complaint was to the effect that many large corporations, which owned
8

BURNS ANNOTATED STATUTES, § 2-602 (1933).

9

Craven v. Craven, supra.
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great tracts of unoccupied lands, were paying taxes on these lands as
well as being the legal title holders, and mere "squatters" had settled
all over these tracts and by 1927, these "squatters" had obtained original titles to these lands by adverse possession. The situation called for
immediate action or these corporations would lose many thousands of
dollars.
The obvious remedy to the tense situation was the passage by the
Indiana Legislature in 1927 of Chapter 42 of the Acts of 1927 Indiana
Legislature:
"Section 1. Be it enacted by the general assembly of the State of
Indiana, that hereafter in any suit to establish title to lands or real
estate no possession thereof shall be deemed adverse to the owner in
such manner as to establish title or rights in and to such land or real
estate unless such adverse possessor or claimant shall have paid and discharged all taxes and special assessmentg of every nature falling due on
such land or real estate during the period he claims to have possessed
the same adversely: Provided, however, that nothing in this Act shall
relieve any adverse possessor or claimant from proving all the elements
of title by adverse possession now required by law." 10
By the passage of this 1927 Statute, the Indiana Legislature in effect creates another requirement to obtain title to land by adverse possession, to-wit: the payment of taxes on the land for the tWenty-year
period.
Thus, it is immediately apparent that this statute is bound to cause
a great deal of controversy among the members of the judicial arm of
the government. It appears very clear that this apparently simple statute
may cause a great problem in statutory construction, and a great deal
of "food for thought" as to its constitutionality, its effect on "squatters"
and sundry other technical legal problems.
So, in short, these two statutes, to-wit: The limitation of twenty
years, in which the owner of land may regain possession, and the statute
requiring the payment of taxes on land for adverse possession, cause
a dilemma among attorneys as to their proper statutory construction.
Problem Created
It is now the purpose of this article to review some of the pertinent
problems which are created by the Adverse Possession Act of 1927,
and also to suggest some possible solutions to these problems.
First, in regard to any legislative act, the question at once arises, is
the act constitutional? A splendid commentary on this phase of the Act
which held the act constitutional, reads in part, ". . . we are also brought
to the conclusion that the act is constitutional because the statute is
10

BuRNs AiNOTATzD

STATUTES, §

3-1314 (1933).
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readily susceptible to a construction which excludes from its operation right and interests vested before the statute became operative.",
Thus, one can dispense with the constitutionality of this statute.
Another question arises as to the rights of a legal title holder as
against an adverse possessor. Let us assume the following facts. Mr. A
has the legal title to a certain tract of land, "Blackacre," which is
situated in Indiana. Mr. B has been in adverse possession of "Blackacre" for twenty years. Mr. B has fully performed all of the requirements for adverse possession in Indiana except payment of the taxes
on said land, which payment of taxes has been made by Mr. A. At the
end of this twenty-year period Mr. A brings a suit in ejectment against
Mr. B. Mr. B's defense is the statute of limitations which in substance requires the legal owner of land to bring any possession proceedings for real property within twenty years. It is at once apparent
that a problem has been created. The question is essentially one of
statutory construction. It is true that Mr. B cannot claim the land as
an adverse possessor for to claim an original title to the land by ad12
verse possession in Indiana, one must have paid the taxes on the land.
But Mr. B wisely doesn't claim adverse possession, he merely claims
that he, Mr. B, can't be ejected from the land because of Mr. A's laches
in not bringing his suit within the prescribed statutory per!od. The writer
submits that Mr. B may not be ejected from the land unless the statute
of limitations 13 and the taxation statute 14 for adverse possession are
read *together, and this tortures the author's concepts of statutory construction. Mr. Gavit, in his learned comment on the problem 15 suggests that the legal title holder should proceed to have title quieted first,
and then eject the "squatter." To reassure one that by getting title
quieted, the legal owner would be assured of possession, Mr. Gavit submits Trittip v. Morgan 16: "The provisions on the subject of quieting
title and recovering possession are too closely interwoven to be separated." But, the fact that this case was decided in 1884, before the
present problem of construction of the statute prevailed seems to lessen
the effectiveness of the quotation.
The writer still contends that even assuming Mr. Gavit's ideas
to be correct and possession to be subsequently recreated in the legal
title holder, yet the adverse possession act in question is defective in
that it certainly creates an ambiguity in the case of Mr. A and Mr. B
submitted by the writer. For, if the courts allow Mr. B to be ejected,
11 Commentaries on the Public Acts of Indiana, 1927 - II The Adverse Possession Act, by G. A. Farabaugh and Walter R. Arnold, 4 IND. L. R. 113 (1927).
12
13
14
15

BURNS ANNOTATED STATUTES, § 3-1314 (1933).
BURNS ANNOTATED STATUTES, § 2-606 (1933).
Burs ANNOTATED STATUTES, § 3-1314 (1933).

In Defense of the Indiana Adverse Possession Act by Alfred H. Gavit.
16 99 Ind. 269 (1884), from Mr. Gavit's article "In Defense of the Indiana
Adverse Possession Act of 1927."
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they have simply overlooked the limitation statute requiring possession
actions to be brought within twenty years, and the case would have been
decided solely on the 1927 Adverse Possession Act requiring payment
of taxes for adverse possession. And, the author submits that is not a
proper rationalization of the two acts in question. Thus, the act of
1927 is defective in substance since it is a poor law which does not
work both ways.
It is true that these adverse possession tax statutes are not a novel
step in legislation 17 and it may be well to review some of the problems
created by them in other jurisdictions, and perhaps attempt possible
solutions to these problems in Indiana under the Adverse Possession
Act of 1927.
Let us consider the problem of an adverse possessor who claims land
on which there has been no tax assessment or an illegal assessment. Does
this dispense with the tax requirement? The Indiana Act says that all
taxes and special assessments "of every nature failing due on such
land or real estate during the period he claims to have possessed the
same adversely" must be paid to justify the claimant to adverse possession. The cases are in hopeless conflict on this point.' 8 The writer
submits that if there is a void assessment or no assessment in fact, then
no taxes fall due and if none fall due, according to the statute, none
need to be paid. However, the problem is one of statutory construction to be determined by the courts.
Also, another problem as to whether the statute requiring tax payment acts retroactively. That is, do those who prior to the act gained
property by adverse possession lose it because they have paid no taxes
on the land. California answers this question in the negative. 19
Another pressing question is, who may pay the taxes? Does the
"squatter" himself have to pay the taxes or may someone in privity
with the adverse claimant pay the taxes? Some states hold that if the
taxes are paid by one having a privity with the adverse claimant this
is all that the statute requires.2 0 However, the Indiana statute specifically requires ". . . the adverse possessor or claimant shall have paid and
discharged all taxes . . ." So, in Indiana, a party, privity to claimant
paying the taxes would probably not be sufficient under the statute.
Also, may the adverse claimant pay the taxes in a lump sum, or can
he only pay the taxes each year as they accrue? Quoting an authority
on this point: "Some courts, even though the statute does not expressly
17 Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, South Dakota,
Utah, Wyoming, Texas and West Virginia, 2 C. J. 203-212, 2 C. J. S. 745.
18 California, Idaho and Kentucky hold the requirement of payment of taxes
is dispensed with where no assessment or void assessment made. Colorado, Illinois,
Missouri, Texas are contra.
19 Wachter v. Bullard, 215 P. 696, 61 Cal. App. 683 (1923).
20 Southern Pacific R. Co. v. Whitaker, 41 P. 1083, 109 Cal. 268 (1895).
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so provide, require claimant to pay the taxes each year of the period
before they become delinquent so that the true owner may have due
notice that his land i§ being claimed adversely. Other courts refuse to
apply such a construction to the statute and hold that the payment
of the accrued taxes for the consecutive years constituting the statutory
period at any time when such taxes are payable during the period is a
sufficient compliance with the statute." 21
Here, then, is another problem of construction which faces the courts
in regard to the Indiana Statute.
So, it is evident that these and many other problems face the courts
when they come to construe this new adverse possession statute.
Conclusion
One may conclude that, by the passage of the 1927 Adverse Possession Act, the rights of a person to gain an original title to land or real
estate by adverse possession, have added one new requirement to the
former pre-requisites, namely, that the adverse claimant must pay taxes
on the land for the statutory period.
The reason for this new requirement is also apparent, the further
protection of the legal title holder and the greater notice afforded to him.
Then, one examined the actual law itself, and saw the conflict of
the Adverse Possession Act 1927 with the Statute of Limitations for
possession of land. It is impossible, in all instances, to construe these
acts separately and rationalize them.
Then, one has viewed the sundry problems which are created by
this type of legislation. From these problems it is evident that in the
near future the courts of Indiana will be called upon to construe this
1927 statute to fit the needs of the populace and the intent of the legislature.
So, this new trend in Indiana Adverse Possession created by
Chapter 42, Acts 1927, Indiana Legislature may afford the desired
change in the Adverse Possession requirement, but the act certainly
creates many new problems in statutory construction, and ample opportunity for attorneys to speculate in the administration of this act before the courts settle all of the questions and problems which confront the students of law in regard to this innovation in adverse possession in Indiana.
James H. Nu.

21

2 C. J. S. (Adverse Possession) § 175.
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ILLINOIS RETAILER'S OCCUPATION TAX-Is THE CONSUMER

(Buy-

ER) LIABLE FOR THE TAx?-To WHAT EXTENT IS THE SELLER EVADING
THE TAx?-The Retailer's Occupation Tax of the state of Illinois has

been given the common name of "sales tax," and the practice has developed in that state of passing this tax on to the consumer as a tax
which is placed upon the consumer or buyer. Thus the retailer in the
state of Illinois after agreeing to sell an article for a stipulated sum will
then add three percent to the sales price and tell the purchaser that the
agreed upon price plus three percent "sales tax" is what the purchaser
must pay for the article. The question thus arises as to whether or not
the tax is a "sales tax" and by what right does the seller represent
to the buyer that the buyer must pay this "sales tax." It is with this
problem that this paper is intended to treat, hence it is necessary to
establish exactly what the tax is, and upon whom is the burden to fall
directly. Indirectly, of course, the tax may fall upon any individual,
but such is not true as to the direct burden of the tax. Excluding all
other problems in relation to this act, let us delve into its exact nature.
The statute gives the short title to the act as "An act in relation to
a tax upon persons engaged in the business of selling tangible personal
property to purchasers for use or consumption." 1 The tax is placed
upon persons engaged in the business of selling personal property to
the ultimate user or consumer. The statute defines a sale at retail in
the following manner: "'A sale at retail' means any transfer of the
ownership of, or title to, tangible personal property to the purchaser,
for use or consumption and not for resale in any form as tangible personal property, for a valuable consideration." 2 The use of the term
"sales tax" in reference to this tax is a legal misnomer, and the cases
on the matter have settled this point definitely. In the case of Herlihy
Mid-Continent Co. v. Nudelman, Director of Finance,3 the court stated
in regard to this tax: "The tax here questioned is not a privilege tax
imposed upon purchasers, like the motor fuel tax; it is not a property
tax upon the items sold; nor is it a sales tax. The tax involved here
is an occupation tax upon a class of vendors and is measured by the
gross receipt from their sales." The case of Franklin County Coal Co.
v. Ames, 4 also holds that the act imposes an occupation tax, and not
a sales tax. Havinj thus seen that the tax in question is an occupation
tax and not a sales tax or property tax, we shall next find out what
the definitions of these various types of taxes have been held to be.
A property tax is a tax levied against property merely for the purpose of raising revenue, and not to control the use or operation of propILmmois REv. STAT. 1939, C. 120 § 440.
Ibid.
3 367 Il. 600, 12 N. E. 2d 638.
1

2

Also Revzon v. Nudelman, Director of Finance, 370 I1. 180, 18 N. E. 2d 219
(1938).
4 Franklin County Coal Co. v. Ames, 359 Ill.
178, 194 N. E. 268 (1934).
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erty. 5 An occupation tax is a tax levied for the purpose of regulating
and controlling a given business or occupation, or levied on the privilege
of exercising, undertaking, or operating any given occupation, trade,
or profession. "Its effect is to license a person engaged in a given calling or occupation. A license in form may not be issued to a taxpayer,
but the payment of the tax is the license under the authority of the
state to engage in such occupation." 6 Hence this case shows that the
retailers who come under this act are obligated to pay the tax for the
privilege of engaging in that business, and such payment constitutes
the securing of a license to engage in that business. Thus it can be seen
that the tax is not one placed upon the purchaser, but is directly upon
the seller. This fact must of necessity be accepted as true, and the
question may then arise as to the authority of the state to so license
business, but the discussion of that matter is not within the scope of
this paper. A sales tax is an excise tax on sales, yet not one on the articles sold.7 It is thus clear that the tax here in question is definitely
an occupation tax as distinguished from either a sales tax or property
tax.
The act provides that the amount of the tax to be paid by the retailer is to be computed by the amount of sales, but this fact does not
make the tax a sales tax. The statute does not purport to levy a tax
upon sales as such, but computes the tax levied for the privilege of following an occupation upon the volume of sales.8 The fact that an occupation tax is measured by gross income or sales does not change its
character, or make it a sales tax. 9
Thus these cases show that the tax is an occupation tax placed upon
the retailer for the privilege of engaging in business. Since the tax is
on the retailer, by what right or authority does he directly pass the
tax on to the buyer? Where a sale is completed, or a contract to sell
is completed, could the purchaser demand possession of the article
bought without paying the so-called "sales tax" that the seller tells him
he must pay? From the cases thus set out it appears that the seller has
no legal right to demand that the buyer pay the tax. If the seller includes the tax in the selling price of the article, then the buyer has
contracted to pay that selling price, and the mere fact that it also
includes the tax is immaterial; but it is in that class of business transactions where the buyer buys an article for a certain price and is later
told that he must pay a "sales tax" that it appears that an injustice is
being done, and that the seller is demanding something to which he has
5 Reif et al. v. Barret, Auditor of Public Accounts, 355 Ill. 104, 188 N. E.
889 (1933).
6 Ibid.
7
Glenn L. Martin Co. v. United States, 23 F. Supp. 262 (1938).
8 In re Messenger's Merchants Lunch, 85 F. 2d 1002 (1936).
9 Seattle Gas Co. v. City of Seattle, 192 Wash. 456, 73 P. 2d 1312 (1937).
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no right. The payment of the three per cent levy by the buyer to the
seller is then a mere donation to the seller.
Upon what theory does the seller directly place this tax upon the
buyer? Is it upon the grounds that the legislature intended that the
three per cent levy be added to every sale? Or perhaps, is it upon the
ground that it has become the well established custom and the buyer
knows that he must pay the tax, hence the buyer should be held to
know that the selling price of all goods will be three per cent more than
advertised, or contracted for?
The first theory is treated in the cases in this state, and is refuted
by these cases. In the case of Franklin Coal Co. v. Ames, Director of
Finance 10 the court held that even though in some instances the seller
may not be able to pass the tax on to the consumers, this is by reason
of competition and is not such an incident as would support an allegation that the act imposes a tax upon the occupation of the seller as is
unlawful or that the legislature did not intend to impose the tax upon
them. If the legislature had intended that the tax be placed upon the
consumer rather than the seller, a sales tax should have been passed, as
was first attempted in Illinois. In the states where sales taxes exist,
the burden is placed upon the buyer directly, and since the Illinois
statute directly and clearly states that the tax is upon the retailer, it
cannot successfully be contended that the legislature intended that the
retailer directly pass it on to the buyer. In the state of Pennsylvania
a case arose involving double taxation as to a sales tax and a license
tax. In that state a retail sales tax ordinance enacted by the city of
Philadelphia was not invalid as applied to various corporations as a
duplicate of the mercantile license tax imposed by the commonwealth,
since the mercantile license tax is an excise tax on the privilege of
doing business, whereas the sales tax is a tax paid by the purchaser
on transactions.'" Where the tax is to be placed directly upon the purchaser, the states having a sales tax express that fact in the statute
creating the tax. Thus this first theory is not well founded.
The second possible theory upon which the seller directly passes
the tax on to the consumer may be more difficult to refute, yet it is
equally unjust. If this custom has been well established that the buyer
has knowledge that the price of any good will be increased by three
percent, such that it must be inferred that such augmented price is
the real selling price in the minds of both parties, and the one actually
agreed upon, by whom was this custom established? It is apparent that
the buyers did not themselves volunteer to pay the tax and thus create
the custom, but such custom, if indeed it exists, was established through
the misrepresentations of the seller to the buyer that the Retailer's Oc10

11

Franklin County Coal Co. v. Ames, 359 11. 178, 194 N. E. 268 (1934).
Blauner's Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 330 Pa. 342, 198 A. 889 (1938).
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cupation Tax was in reality a "sales tax" placed upon all sales, and that
the buyer must pay the tax. Hence the seller through misrepresentation
and fraud would be said to have created a custom which enables him to
fraudulently pass on the tax to the buyer. To hold to this last theory
would be to place a premium upon fraud, and such the law cannot do.
To refute this second theory in another manner, it is expedient to
go back to an old legal maxim and pure reasoning. The legal maxim is
that every person is presumed to know the law. Since the buyer is a
person, the buyer is presumed to the know the law. The law is
that the seller is obligated to pay the tax to the state. Since the
buyer is presumed to know the law, the buyer is thus presumed
to know that the seller must pay the tax to the state. Now taxes
are a part of the cost of business, and the selling price of articles
is determined by the costs of production and distribution. This is a fact
known to the average layman. Now since the buyer is the average
layman, he knows that the selling price of the articles he purchases is
determined by cost, and that the taxes on that business are included
in the selling price. Hence, since the buyer is presumed to know that
the seller must pay the tax in question, and since he also knows that
such tax is one of the elements that determines the selling price of the
articles, he thus can assume that the selling price he has agreed to pay
already includes the tax. Hence it cannot be said that he knows that the
tax will be added to the price he has agreed to pay, for he already is
presumed to know that the selling price has already included the tax.
Thus with a simple legal maxim, a few bits of common knowledge, and
a bit of reasoning set out in syllogistic form, the theory that the buyer
knows and expects that the tax will be added to the price he ,has agreed
to pay for an article is refuted.
Thus we have a practice in the state of Illinois which seems to have
no legal basis for its existence. It must be remembered that herein we
are dealing only with those cases in which the seller attaches the tax
to the sales price after such has been agreed upon by the parties. In
the cases where the seller notifies the buyer that the selling price of the
goods is the advertised price plus the three percent levy, then the buyer
knows that he will have to pay the augmented selling price, not the
price advertised, and he cannot complain. Even in cases of this kind,
while there may be nothing legally wrong, is it to be considered very
moral or decent to advertise goods for sale at one price, and then sell
at a price three percent higher? This is the practice in the state of
Illinois, where the seller creates desires and demands for certain goods
by advertising them for sale at one price, and then, upon getting the
interest of the public aroused to such an extent that they want the article, charges them not the advertised price, but a price three percent
higher. This is an unethical practice and should not be condoned.
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Further authority for the contention that this tax is not to be passed
on to the buyer as a direct tax, and one which the buyer is legally obligated to pay, is found in the tax cases of the federal government.
State, county, town and municipal taxes, paid or accrued within the
fiscal year, are deductible from gross income in that year in computing
the amount of taxable income under the federal income tax. 12 Yet the
federal tax board has held that the tax imposed under the Retailer's
Occupation Tax Act of Illinois, being imposed upon and payable by
the vendor, is not deductible by the vendee even though the latter makes
payment to the vendor of the amount of the tax. 13 Thus the federal
government does not recognize that this tax is placed on the buyer,
and even though the buyer does pay the tax, he cannot deduct such
payment from his gross income in determining the amount due under
the federal income tax. Hence since all other state taxes levied upon the
individual and paid by him are deductible, this one is not, for it is not
levied upon him, and his payment of such is in. the nature of a mere
donation to the seller.
Section six of the act provides that when any amount of tax has been
paid which was not due under this act, whether as a result of mistake
of fact or on error of law, then such amount shall be credited against
any tax due or to become due under this act from the person who
made the erroneous payment, or such amount shall be refunded to such
person by the department. In cases where persons not subject to the
tax paid it to the state, they were refunded their money. 14 If these individuals who through mistake paid the tax directly to the state were
allowed to get their money back, what right has the individual buyer
who pays the tax, not directly to the state, but to the seller who represents to him that he must pay the "sales tax," under the mistaken belief that he was legally obligated to pay the tax as such, to have this
money refunded on the grounds that he paid it under a mistake of law
or fact? This question has not been answered by the courts, but it is
worthy of thought.
From our research up to this point it is apparent that the sellers
collect this three precent tax from the buyers, either on the grounds
that the tax is directly placed upon the buyer, or that the selling price
of the goods sold is not what was advertised and agreed upon, but
actually that price plus the rate of the tax. We have seen that the tax
is not directly placed upon the buyer, and if the seller collects it on that
theory he is receiving this money under false and fraudulent representations to the buyer, and is collecting it as a tax, in which case the buyer
is paying the tax under mistake, and should be able to sue under Section
1 B. T.
Eckstein
14 Herlihy
(1938); People,
12

A. 194 (1924); 8 B. T. A. 112 (1927); 2 B. T. A. 788 (1925).

13

v. C. I. R., 41 B. T. A. 746 (1940).
Mid-Continent Co. v. Nudelman, 370 Ill. 237, 18 N. E. 2d 225
ex rel. Blome v. Nudelman, 373 Ill. 220, 25 N. E. 2d 811 (1940).
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Six of the act and recover the amount so erroneously paid. If the seller
collects the tax on the theory that it is a part of the sales price, then
he must pay to the state a tax upon the entire amount collected from
the buyer. As a matter of practice in many stores in the state, the seller
lists the price of the goods, and the three per cent "sales tax" collected
separately, and pays the state the tax on the price listed, but not on the
"sales tax" collected. As mentioned before, the act provides that the
tax is to be collected on the gross sales of the business. Now if the retailer treats the amount he collects from the buyer under the term of
"sales tax" as a part of the sales price of the articles, then that amount
must be included in totalling the gross sales as a part of the purchase
price, and the three per cent levy will apply to it also. The fact that
this is not done in many of the businesses in the state shows that there
is widespread evasion of the tax. Hence the retailer who collects the
"sales tax" from the buyer must beware, for if he collects it under the
theory that the buyer is legally obligated to pay, he may be liable to
repay it to the buyer; or if he collects it under the theory that it is
understood that it is a part of the purchase price and is collectible as
such, he must pay the state the tax on the part so collected, as well-as
on what he lists as the price of the goods, for the tax is a levy on the
amount of the gross sales, and the complete selling price of each article
sold must be totalled in computing the gross income from sales.
By way of comparison, this tax in Illinois does not resemble a sales
tax, but instead resembles a tax such as the gross income tax of the
state of Indiana as applied to business. In Indiana the retailer is obligated to pay a tax upon the gross income from his business, and while
he must make his prices higher to be able to make enough to pay the
tax, the custom has not arisen there to charge the tax to every purchaser,
and probably will not arise, for it is doubtful that the seller could collect such tax. With two sister states having taxes which resemble each
other, and the practice of merchants as to those taxes differing widely,
the question arises as to why such a difference exists. Perhaps it is that
the retailers of the state of Illinois are more adept at being able to sell
ideas to the public, even though such ideas or facts are not true.
Thus it is seen that the so called "sales tax" of the state of Illinois
is not a sales tax, but an occupation tax; it is not a tax placed upon
the buyer, but is rather placed upon the seller; the practice of collecting it from the buyer as if the buyer were under the direct legal obligation to pay, is without legal foundation; and the collecting of the
tax from the buyer as a part of the sales price without paying a tax
upon the extra amount collected is an evasion of the tax by the retailer.
Lawrence J. Petroshius.
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THE CHANGED NATURE OF INCOME IN A JOINT RETURN UNDER
FEDERAL INCOME TAx.-Under the Federal Income Tax law, it has

long been possible for a man and wife to file a joint tax return; it is
important to determine the nature of the income in such a return. For
some time, this income was thought to be the income of two separate
taxpayers. Recently the Supreme Court of the United States decided
that such income is the result of a single entity, the separate incomes
of the spouses comprising a unit, taxable as such, regardless of which
spouse furnished the income and which spouse furnished the deductions.
The importance of such a determination is evident in the computation of any deduction which is limited to a certain portion or percentage
of the income. It is obvious on examination of the cases that this
changed nature of the income in a joint return may, in some cases at
least, result in a saving in amount of taxes paid under a joint return.
The new ruling was handed down by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Helvering v. lanney,' and in Taft v. Helvering.2 At
the same time that it decided the Janney case, the Supreme Court also
reversed and remanded a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals of
the Second Circuit, Gaines v. Helvering.3 In these cases, the court expressly rules that the income as reflected in a joint return filed by man
and wife is the aggregate net income of the man and wife, the two
persons being deemed an entity for tax purposes rather than as two
individual taxpayers.
The Revenue Act of 1934, Section 51 (b), 4 provides: "If a husband
and wife living together have an aggregate net income for the taxable
year of $2,500 or over, or an aggregate gross income for such year of
$5,000 or over - (1) Each shall make such a return, or (2) The income of each shall be included in a single joint return, in which case
the tax shall be computed on the aggregate income." This provides the
basis for the filing of a joint return by a man and wife if they so choose.
In 1934, Walter C. Janney and his wife, Pauline F. M. Janney, filed
a single joint tax return with the collector of internal revenue for the
first district of Pennsylvania at Philadelphia. They lived together for
the entire year at Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania. During that year Mrs.
Janney realized a gain from the sale of capital assets in the amount
of $127,501.00. The amount of such gains which was taxable under
the 1934 Revenue Act, Section 117 (a), 5 was $94,491.00. During the
same year Mr. Janney suffered losses from the sale of capital assets
of $229,544.66. The amount of this to be taken into account under
Section 117 (a) of the Revenue Act was $91,963.35. In filing their
1

61 S. Ct. 241 (1940).

2

61 S. Ct. 244 (1940).

3

61 S. Ct. 241 (1940) reversing 111 F. 2d 144 (1940).

4 26 U. S. C. A. Int. Rev. Acts, p. 683.
5 26 U. S. C. A. Int. Rev. Acts, p. 707.
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joint return for 1934 Mr. and Mrs. Janney showed the $94,491.00 as
an inclusion in gross income and deducted the $91,963.35 loss in toto.
The return showed a net income of $26,160.30 on which taxes amounted
to $1,648.91. Under Treasury Regulation 86, Article 117-5, the commissioner refused to allow the loss of $91,963.35 to be deducted except to the extent of $2,000.00 as provided for by Section 117 (d) of
the Revenue Act of 1934.6 Thus the disallowance was $89,963.35, giv7
ing rise to a deficiency in the tax of $37,109.29.
The Revenue Act of 1934 provides: Section 23 (j) "Losses from
sales or exchanges of capital assets shall be allowed only to the extent
provided in Section 117 (d)"; 8 Section 117 (d) "Limitations on Capital Losses. Losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets shall be allowed only to the extent of $2,000.00 plus the gains from such sales
or exchanges.... -9
Treasury Regulation 86, Article 117-5, which gave rise to the Commissioner's ruling, provides: "Application of section 117 in the case
of husband and wife. - In the application of section 117 a husband
and wife, regardless of whether a joint return or separate returns are
made, are considered to be separate taxpayers. Accordingly the limitation under section 117 (d) on the allowance of losses of one spouse
from sales or exchange of capital assets is in all cases to be computed
without regard to gains and losses of the other spouse upon sales or
exchanges of capital assets." On the authority of this regulation and
Pierce v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,' 0 the Board of Tax Appeals upheld the commissioner and disallowed the deduction."
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the
decision of the Board of Tax Appeals.' 2 The court agreed with the
dissent given by Judge Learned Hand in the Pierce case, saying: "Other
allowable deductions in excess of gross income of one spouse may be
deducted from the net income of the other, for otherwise there would
be no point in filing a joint return. Thus the right to file the joint return involves the necessity of disregarding the source from which the
deduction is derived." "Since the statute provides that in the case of
a joint return 'the tax shall be computed on the aggregate income' it
logically and indeed necessarily follows, in the absence of an express
statutory provision to the contrary, that in arriving at joint net in6 26 U.S.C.A.Int. Rev. Acts, p. 708.

7 This, deficiency also represents the deficiency due to a disallowed loss of
$729.82, but for purposes of this article, the item is inconsequential.
8 26 U. S. C. A. Int. Rev. Acts, p. 673.
9 Supra, note 6.
10
11
12

100 F. 2d 397 (1938).
39 B. T. A. 240 (1939).
108 F. 2d 564 (1939).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

come both gross income and deductions of the spouses must be aggregated and treated as the income and deductions of a single taxpayer."
The Pierce case had arisen on a similar set of facts, and on appeal
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had upheld the
commissioner in his reliance on the treasury regulation in question.
In his dissent in that case, Judge Learned Hand had said: "When Section 51 (b) (2) requires the tax to be computed on the net aggregate
income, it means the balance found by adding together all those items
of gross income, which both spouses would be obliged to enter on both
their separate returns, and subtracting all those deductions, which the
statute allowed to both upon such returns." Hand argues that the basis
of the privilege of filing a joint return is the disregarding of the source
of income: "the spouses exercise it only when they can get some benefit
from it; that is, when some loss of one can be set off against some gain
of another."
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the lower court's ruling in the Janney case. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes gave the
opinion: "The 'aggregate income,' to which paragraph 2 of Section 51
(b) refers, is clearly the aggregate net income as it is the aggregate
income on which the 'tax shall be computed.' In that view the deductions to which either spouse would be entitled would be taken, in the
case of a joint return, from the aggregate gross income." The court
concludes, "We are of the opinion that under the provisions of the Act
of 1934 as to joint returns of husband and wife, which embodied a
policy set forth in substantially the same terms for many years, Congress intended to provide for a tax on the aggregate net income and
that the losses of one spouse might be deducted from the gains of the
other; and that this applied as well to deductions for capital losses as to
other deductions. This, we think, was the meaning of the provision of
the Revenue Act of 1934 when it was enacted, and it was subject to
change only by Congress, and not by the Department." Thus, the
court expressly reversed the holding of the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in Gaines v. Helvering, and impliedly reversed
Pierce v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, which the Circuit Court
relied on in ruling the Gaines case.
The Taft case arose under the regulation of the Treasury whereby
the deductions in respect to charitable contributions are to be computed in regard to the income of the spouse making the contribution.
Henry W. Taft and his wife Julia W. S. Taft of New York, N. Y. in
the years 1934 and 1935 filed joint tax returns. In 1934 the aggregate
net income was $83,682.99 after making a deduction of $2,852.00 for
charitable contributions. Of this Mrs. Taft contributed more than half,
$1,477.00 and her husband $1,375.00. Without reference to her deductions, Mrs. Taft's net income for the year was only $12.10. In 1935 the
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aggregate net income of the couple was $92,374.59 after making a deduction of $2,715.80 for charitable contributions. Mrs. Taft's contributions accounted for $1,545.80 of this and Mr. Taft's for $1,170.00.
Mrs. Taft's net income for that year was $15.30. During both years,
except for the nominal amount of her own net income, the source of
Mrs. Taft's contributions were gifts from her husband. By the Revenue
Act of 1934 and 1935 the amount of charitable contributions deductible
was limited to 15% of the net income. 13 Treasury Regulation 86 Article 23 (o)-I provides: "Contributions or gifts by individuals. Whether a husband and wife make a joint return or separate return,
the 15 percent limitation of the deduction for contributions or gifts is
based on the separate net income (computed without regard to such
contributions of gifts) of the spouse making the contributions or gifts."
By applying this regulation, the Commissioner disallowed the contributions made by Mrs. Taft except to the extent of 15% of $12.10 and
of $15.30. This gave rise to a petition on the part of the taxpayers for
redetermination of tax for 1934 and 1935 in the amounts of $722.79
and $827.17 respectively. The petitioners asserted the single entity
of a joint return but the Board of Tax Appeals upheld the Commissioner. 14 On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Board's
ruling.15 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision to bring it into harmony with the Janney case. The opinion in
both cases were handed down on the same day. The court laid stress
on the fact that a joint return is to be treated as a "taxable unit." The
court said, "We are of the opinion that under the Revenue Act of 1934,
taken with the meaning we think it had when enacted, petitioners were
entitled to the combined deductions they claimed, and that the departmental regulation to the contrary was ineffective to deprive them
of that right."
Although these two cases were decided in regard to previous Revenue
Acts and the Treasury Regulations promulgated by those acts, the effectiveness of the decisions will not be lost on current code provisions
and departmental regulations. 1 Treasury Regulation 103 Section 19.23
(o)-l isexactly the same as Treasury Regulation 86 Article 23 (o)-i.
Treasury Regulation 103 was promulgated by the Revenue Act of
1940. Under the current Revenue Act, capital gains and losses are
either short term or long term, depending on whether the securities
from which the gain or loss arises has been held more or less than
eighteen months. Treasury Regulation 103 Section 19.117-5 provides:
"Application of section 117 in the case of husband and wife. (a) Shortterm capital gains and losses. - Under the general rule with respect
13 26 U. S. C. A. Int. Rev. Acts, p. 674.
14 40 B. T. A. 229 (1940).
111 F. 2d 145 (1940).
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to taking deductions in a joint return of husband and wife, a deduction
which is not allowable in computing the net income of one spouse making a separate return is not allowable in a joint return made by both
spouses. Hence the limitation under paragraph (2) of section 117 (d),
prior to its amendment, and'section 117 (d) as amended, relating to the
allowance of short term capital losses, is in the case of one spouse, to
be computed without regard to the short-term capital gains and losses
of the other spouse, regardless of whether a joint return or separate
returns are filed." By this regulation the department seeks to prevent
the deductions of short-term capital losses of one spouse from the
short term capital gain of the other spouse in a joint return. There is
little doubt but that the Supreme Court would overrule this regulation as readily as it did the former regulation. These two decisions make
the inconsistency between legislative and departmental provisions just
as great now as under the 1934 act.
Richard F. Swisher.

WILLS-THE LUCID

INTERVAL IN TESTAMENTARY MENTAL CAPAC-

ITv.-Testamentary mental capacity is necessary to make a valid will.
Juctice Blackstone spoke of it i when psychiatry in its present form
was unknown and the treatment of mental defectives a crude science.
Despite the serious nature of mental illness in its varied forms, there
occasionally occurs, as we shall later see, a lapse in the condition, producing a period of lucidity. Courts have accepted the mental capacity
present in such periods, and the doctrine that "a will executed by a
testator in a lucid interval is valid," 2 has enjoyed almost universal
acceptance. In an early American case, it was decided that deliberation
and thought, in the execution of a will, may establish a complete intermission of the insanity of one before afflicted with habitual insanity.3
Because of differences in expert testimony and the limited medical
knowledge of the courts, the problem of giving a strict definition of the
term "lucid interval" is still present today. An early attempt to define
the term can be found in English law. It was described as "an interval
in which the Mind, having thrown off the disease, had recovered its gen1 "Madmen, or otherwise 'non compotes,' idiots, or natural fools, persons
grown childish by reason of old age or distemper, such as have their senses
besotted with drunkenness - all these are incapable, by reason of mental disability, to make any will so long as such disability lasts." Commentaries II. p. 497.
2 In re Martin's Estate, 170 Cal. 657, 151 P. 138 (1915) ; Lum v. Lasch, 93
Miss. 81, 46 So. 559 (1908); In re McDermott's Will, 14 Mills 356. 154 N. Y. S.
923 (1915).
3 Lee's Heirs v. Lee's Executors, 4 McCord 183 (S. C.), 17 Am. Dec. 722
(1827).
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eral habit." 4 Professor Page has criticized this language, however, because it places an unreasonably high standard of mental capacity where
a lesser one would be adequate. He further states that such an interval,
according to scientific findings, is rarely found.5 The New York court,
in defining the mental capacity present in a lucid interval, states that
the testator must be laboring under no delusions with reference to those
who have claims on his bounty. 6 Another legal writer, in speaking of
the period of lucidity, says "but the legal idea is that the insane person's mind, though not positively and absolutely restored to normal
health, was at least capable, at the time of the testamentary act, of performing that act, and did so with independence and intelligence
sufficient to justify the conclusion that his will should be sustained as
a valid one." 7 Two definitions are found in Melody v. Hamblin.s The
first follows to a great extent the stand taken in Attorney-General v.
Parnther,9 while the second insists upon a complete recovery without
any possibility of a relapse.
There are many examples of the lucid interval occurring in specific
mental diseases that have come before the courts. A Maine case recognized the testamentary capacity of a person afflicted with senile dementia when the will was made during a lucid interval. 10 A "pathologically unsound mind" was the illness of a testator whose will was allowed
in another case." A Louisiana case permitted the will of a patient suffering from delirium tremens to be probated because it was made during a lucid period.' 2 The existence of acceptable mental capacity during monomania can be seen in Gholson v. Peters."s
The presence of lucid intervals in mental illness will manifest itself
in ways peculiar to each psychosis. Strictly speaking, lucidity may not
always indicate acceptable testamentary capacity. In Catatonia Stupor,
a type of Dementia Praecox, the patient suffers from a disorder of the
will and not an intellectual disorder proper. Lucidity is often maintained
despite the fact that the patient may appear unconscious.' 4 Obviously
the presence of negativism, stereotypy (in features and attitudes) and
pathological suggestibility in these cases renders the will unfit to make
a disposition of property. Negativism alone might make the intention
4

Attorney-General v. Parmther, 3 Brown Ch. 441.
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6 In re White, 15 N. Y. St. Rep. 753 (1888).
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8 115 S. W. 2d 237 (Tenn., 1938).
9 Note 4, supra.
10 In re Loomis' Will, 133 Me. 81, 174 Atl. 38 (1934).
11 Daly v. Hussey, 275 Mass. 28, 174 N. E..916 (1931).
12 Succession of Cronzeilles, 106 La. 442, 31 So. 64 (19.01).
13 176 So. 605 (Miss., 1937).
14 RosAorr, MANUA. Or PsycniATRY, 1927, Ch. III, p. 108.

